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What is the sound of a corporation
speaking? How the cognitive theory of
metaphor can help lawyers shape the law
Linda L. Berger
I. Introduction
Metaphor is a lens.1 Through this sentence, I intend to call your
attention to metaphor’s power to focus, to filter, and to block. Even though
this quality could be phrased as a similarity — a metaphor is like a lens
because it focuses and filters — metaphor is more than a figure of speech
based on similarity. Metaphor is a map.2 Its power to shape and direct your
understanding by superimposing a known structure onto a new concept
makes metaphor fundamental to thinking and learning.
Metaphor is conversation.3 Its meaning comes from an interaction
between the target — an abstract or unfamiliar concept — and the source —
something concrete and already known — and between the qualities and
properties that each of these entails. The interaction emphasizes certain
perspectives of the target and the source, and it expands your view of each.
So, for example, the map metaphor draws your attention to the shaping and
directing qualities of a map rather than to its depictions of distances and
boundaries. The interaction of the word map with the word metaphor helps
you see the map-like qualities of a metaphor: that it guides you along certain
paths, that it points you toward particular landmarks, and that it imprints
understood forms onto uncharted ideas. The interaction may cast light on the

© Linda L. Berger 2004. Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I very
much appreciate the assistance and comments of my research assistant, Michael Thompson; my
colleagues, Marybeth Herald, Carol Parker, Michael Smith; and the anonymous reviewers.
1. The concept of metaphor as a filter or lens comes from Max Black, Models and
Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy 41 (Cornell U. Press 1962) (“We can say that the
principal subject is ‘seen through’ the metaphorical expression — or, if we prefer, that the
principal subject is ‘projected upon’ the field of the subsidiary subject.”).
Throughout the article, I will use boldface type when I wish to emphasize that a particular
word or phrase is a metaphor or that the argument being made is grounded in metaphor.
2. Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 Emory L.J. 1197,
1212 (2001).
3. See I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 92-94 (Oxford U. Press 1936).
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metaphor-like qualities of a map as well, revealing that maps shape our views
as much as they direct our journeys.4
Metaphor is grounded.5 It grows out of our physical beings, our neural
networks, and our experiences in the world. Although grounded, metaphor is
imagination. It springs from our capacity to see one thing as another, giving
us legs and eyes to make the leap from there to here.
Together, these concepts form the core of the cognitive theory of
metaphor.6 This theory reconstructs the foundation in which metaphor was
seen as merely literary or rhetorical in contrast with the “real” literal and
scientific world. In cognitive theory, metaphor is not only a way of seeing or
saying; it is a way of thinking and knowing, the method by which we structure
and reason, and it is fundamental, not ornamental.
This article will argue that better understanding of metaphor’s cognitive
role can help lawyers shape the law. According to cognitive theory, metaphor
molds our understanding, our reasoning, and our evaluation in persuasive and
invisible ways. If metaphor is not merely a literary device but instead creates
meaning, it is a particularly powerful and inescapable method of using
language to persuade. To argue against a dominant metaphor, lawyers must
be able to uncover it; to argue for a new metaphor, lawyers must be able to
imagine it. Studying the work of cognitive researchers builds such perception
and imagination: the more we know about the work of the mind, the use of
language, and the means of persuasion, the more critical, insightful, and
persuasive we can be.7

4. See e.g. Black, supra n. 1, at 44 (“If to call a man a wolf is to put him in a special light,
we must not forget that the metaphor makes the wolf seem more human than he otherwise
would.”)
5. See Richards, supra n. 3, at 12 (“We shall do better to think of a meaning as though it
were a plant that has grown — not a can that has been filled or a lump of clay that has been
moulded.”).
6. For its understanding of cognitive theory and research about metaphor, this article
relies primarily on the following books and articles: George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors
We Live By (U. of Chicago Press 1980) [hereinafter Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By];
George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (U. of
Chicago Press 1987) [hereinafter Lakoff, Women, Fire]; Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The
Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (U. of Chicago Press 1987); George Lakoff & Mark
Turner, More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (U. of Chicago Press
1989)[hereinafter Lakoff & Turner, More than Cool Reason]; Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination:
Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (U. of Chicago Press 1993); George Lakoff & Mark
Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (Basic Books
1999) [hereinafter Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh]; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (1987) [hereinafter Winter,
Standing]; Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989)[hereinafter Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense]; Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind (U. of
Chicago Press 2001) [hereinafter Winter, A Clearing in the Forest].
7. David M. Zlotnick, The Buddha’s Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
957, 1008 (2001) (suggesting that legal writers undertake more self-conscious use of rhetoric).
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As a way to explore metaphor’s role in shaping the law, the article focuses
on how a particular lawsuit was influenced by metaphor, in particular, by the
primary metaphor that a corporation is a person within the more complex
metaphorical system suggested by the marketplace of ideas model for First
Amendment protection. The interaction of these two metaphors has guided
the development of First Amendment doctrine protecting the speech of
corporations. Without these metaphors, statements issued by corporations
would not qualify for First Amendment protection; corporations are artificial
entities without ideas or views, without a voice to express them, without an
interest in self-realization, and without a vote in democratic self-government.
Because of these metaphors, it is almost impossible to overcome the
assumption that corporations speak and that they should be welcome to
engage in debate with other voices in a marketplace free of government
regulation.
Rather than to criticize the development of corporate speech doctrine, the
purpose of this article is to uncover and examine the use of metaphor in the
lawyers’ arguments and the judges’ decision making.8 The next section,
section II, describes the cognitive theory of metaphor; section III examines
the metaphors underlying First Amendment protection for corporate speech;
section IV analyzes the use of metaphor in the briefs filed in the U.S. Supreme
Court in a lawsuit brought by a consumer activist against Nike, Inc., alleging
violation of California’s false advertising and unfair competition statutes.9
Following that analysis, section V of the article will conclude with a series of
recommendations for practicing lawyers.
II. Constructing the cognitive theory of metaphor
Often viewed as “[a] figure of speech in which a term is transferred from
the object it ordinarily designates to an object it may designate only by implicit
comparison or analogy,”10 metaphor is seen in cognitive theory as far more
meaningful than that. By asking that we imagine a new idea “as” a more
familiar one or an abstract concept “as” a concrete object, metaphor enables
us to perceive and understand the unfamiliar. Psychological and linguistic
researchers believe that metaphor is a powerful imaginative tool because it
embodies experience and reflects the way the mind works.11 Growing out of
our physical and mental experience, grounded in a cultural and social context,
metaphor shapes thought by mapping onto the new experience the structures,
inferences, and reasoning methods of the old.
8. Unconsidered acceptance of a metaphor can relieve judicial decision-makers “of the
obligation of thought.” Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech is Not Free,
83 Iowa L. Rev. 995, 1020 (1998).
9. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). The Supreme Court
dismissed its writ as improvidently granted after receiving the briefs and hearing oral arguments.
10. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (William Morris ed., New
College Ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1979).
11. See generally Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, supra n. 6
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A. The discovery of the anti-foundation
In the first extended philosophical treatment of metaphor, Aristotle
sowed the seeds of the fundamentalist view12 that metaphor is false,
dangerous, and suspect.13 In the Poetics, Aristotle wrote that “[m]etaphor
consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the
transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or
from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.”14 This description appears
to restrict metaphor to words rather than sentences, to depict metaphor as a
departure from literal use (laying the groundwork for the separation of
figurative or literary language from literal language), and to suggest that
metaphor is based on similarities. Much later, the fundamentalist view of
metaphor echoed these concepts; in particular, fundamentalists insisted that
you could distinguish between the content and the expressive functions of
language and that knowledge could be reduced to a system of literal and
verifiable sentences.
This view predominated until the 20th century when I.A. Richards, a
literary critic, advanced new arguments. First, he claimed that metaphor is a
principle of thought, not just a matter of language. “Thought is metaphoric,
and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive
therefrom.”15 Second, he wrote, metaphor is not a deviation from the norm,
but runs throughout ordinary thought and language; ordinary ways of thinking
are structured by metaphor. Third, Richards claimed, metaphor raises issues
about the nature of knowledge and reality and should not be treated as a mere
rhetorical device or stylistic ornament. Fourth, Richards theorized that
metaphor works as “two thoughts of different things active together and
12. The traditional view is referred to by many names: fundamentalism, foundationalism,
positivism, objectivism, rationalism. In these views, rational thought and literal, permanent
truth is contrasted with emotion, expression, and subjective or contingent truth. “By
‘fundamentalism’ I mean the view that all meaning is specifiable in sets of literal concepts and
propositions that can apply directly to our given experience and that reasoning is a rule-like
activity that operates logically and linearly with these concepts.” Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate,
67 Brook. L. Rev. 949, 952-63 (2002). Lakoff calls the fundamentalist view “objectivism”
because “[m]odern attempts to make it work assume that rational thought consists of the
manipulation of abstract symbols and that these symbols get their meaning via a
correspondence with the world, objectively construed, that is, independent of the
understanding of any organism.” Lakoff, Women, Fire, supra n. 6, at xii.
13. See Mark Johnson, Introduction: Metaphor in the Philosophical Tradition, in Philosophical
Perspectives on Metaphor 3, 3-4 (Mark Johnson ed., U. of Minn. Press 1981); but see Michael Frost,
Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 Leg. Writing 113, 118 (1996) (arguing that
Aristotle thought that metaphor provides insights not achievable by other means).
14. Aristotle, The Poetics, in The Rhetoric and The Poetics of Aristotle, 223, 251 (7457b lines 811) (Ingram Bywater trans., Random House 1954).
15. Richards, supra n. 3, at 94. Richards is credited with the early development of New
Rhetoric, a theory which suggested that ambiguity is essential to the use of language and that
meaning results from a series of interactions. For an application of this theory to the teaching
of legal writing, see Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. Leg. Educ. 155 (1999).
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supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their
interaction.” Metaphor “is a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts,
a transaction between contexts.”16 Finally, Richards wrote, metaphors not
only rely on images and similarities but also express concepts and
dissimilarities; because their meaning is a product of a special interaction, they
cannot be reduced to paraphrase.17
Since the 1980s, the study of metaphor has been much affected by the
research and theory of George Lakoff, a professor of linguistics, and Mark
Johnson, a professor of philosophy. In a series of books published between
1980 and 1999, Lakoff and Johnson developed a theory called
“experientialism.”18 In this theory, metaphor refers “to a cognitive process by
which we use a concrete, experienced source domain to structure and
understand a more abstract domain.”19 These authors claim that the
experientialist approach can resolve the concerns of both objectivism, which
seeks understanding from objective measurements in the external world, and
subjectivism, whose gauges are based on internal or personal standards. The
experientialist approach overcomes the separation of humans from their
environment by suggesting instead that our understanding of the world is
reached through our interaction and “constant negotiation with the
environment and other people.”20
B. Building the framework
Cognitive scientists study thinking: how we gather information and what
we do with it.21 In particular, cognitive science studies the processes involved
in thinking, memory, learning, and recall; it attempts to link (1) behavioral
levels of response to stimuli to (2) the cognitive level of thought processes to
(3) the biological level of neural pathways.22 Cognitive scientists have found
that expert problem solving involves a process of recognizing patterns and
retrieving solutions from a stored repertoire acquired by encountering similar
problems in the past. Experts appear to understand information and develop
interpretations by matching the new information to schema (knowledge
structures), scripts, or models that embody prototypical expectations about
the world. These structures are cognitively efficient because they allow people
to make decisions without complete information. 23 Not only do they make it
easier for us to understand simple objects and concepts, they also can give
meaning to more complex activities and sequences of events that unfold over
16. Richards, supra n. 3, at 92-94.
17. Id.
18. See supra n. 6.
19. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra n. 6, at 1237 n. 25.
20. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 230.
21. Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of
the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 Willamette L. Rev. 315, 324 (1997).
22. Hunter, supra n. 2, at 1204.
23. See Lustbader, supra n. 21, at 325-327 & n. 20.
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time.24 Like schema, analogy, and narrative, metaphor is a stored structure
that makes a new concept meaningful by mapping or transferring
relationships and inferences from one concept to another.25
1. What is metaphor’s cognitive status?
At the heart of the new metaphorical theory is that “[m]eaning is neither
‘in us’ nor ‘out there’ but resides in the imaginative processes by which we
order experience and make it meaningful.”26 I. A. Richards first suggested
that metaphor had such a cognitive basis in the 1930s. Some thirty years later,
in an essay called Metaphor, the philosopher Max Black argued that the use of
one complex system to select, emphasize, and organize relations in another
field was a distinctive intellectual operation, one that could not be explained as
comparison or by literal paraphrase, and that in some cases, the use of the
metaphor created the similarity in meaning rather than merely reflecting it.27
According to Lakoff and Johnson, cognitive science supports the claim
that metaphor shapes thinking.28 Research shows that thinking about abstract
concepts is “embodied,” often unconscious, and mostly metaphorical. 29
Thinking is “embodied” because “the same neural and cognitive mechanisms
that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems
and modes of reason.”30 The mental structures we use are meaningful because
they are connected to our bodies and our physical experiences. Basic-level
concepts grow out of our “motor schemas and our capacities for gestalt
perception and image formation” while primary metaphors projected by our
brains allow us to “conceptualize abstract concepts on the basis of inferential
patterns used in sensorimotor processes that are directly tied to the body.”31
Everyday reasoning is structured and molded by a series of cognitive
metaphors. These metaphors are cognitive because they organize thinking
and experiential because they arise out of physical experience. Conceptual
metaphors are reflected in linguistic metaphors. There is, for example, a
communal, cognitive, conceptual metaphor that argument is war; its structure
is reflected in linguistic expressions. The metaphor shapes what we do and

24. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions
of Theory, 45 J. Leg. Educ. 313, 338 (1995).
25. Hunter, supra n. 2, at 1212. According to Hunter, analogy differs from metaphor
because “analogies are used to explain or predict reasoning directly by reference to the analog.
Metaphors . . . may carry an underlying cognitive structure that constrains thinking, but they do
not determine the outcome of a case.” Id. at 1209-10.
26. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 106.
27. Black, supra n. 1, at 38-44.
28 Support for this claim is provided throughout the Lakoff & Johnson sources cited in
supra n. 6.
29. Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, supra n. 6, at 3.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 77-78.
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how we understand what we do; it structures the steps we take when we
argue.32
[W]e don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can
win or lose arguments. See the person as an opponent. We attack his
positions and we defend our own. We plan and use strategies. . . .
Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the
concept of war . . . . There is a verbal battle, and the structure of an
argument — attack, defense, counterattack, etc. reflects this.33
2. How does metaphor work?
The word metaphor is a metaphor derived from experience, coming from
the Greek words that mean “to carry over” and suggesting that the meanings
and ideas associated with one thing are carried over to another.34 Before its
reconstruction, metaphor was believed to carry over meaning by substitution
or comparison. In either view, metaphor was an indirect way of presenting an
intended literal meaning, which is that A is like B in certain respects. Both
substitution and comparison have been criticized on the grounds that (1)
“[a]ny two objects are similar in some respects and the comparison view does
not explain how we are able to pick out the relevant similarities”; (2) these
theories overlook the sometimes crucial role of differences and fail to explain
how the metaphorical assertion may be true even if the similarity is false; and
(3) many metaphors simply are not based on literal similarities.35 For example,
the conceptual metaphor that More is Up is based not on similarity, but on
the correlation between adding more things to a pile and seeing the top of the
pile go “up.”36
A third view, that the source and the target interact to create meaning,
was derived from I. A. Richards’ argument that meaning is generated from the
interaction between two thoughts present at the same time.37 As Max Black
explains this theory, in the metaphor Man is a Wolf, the system of associated
commonplaces of Man — that is, the properties and relationships commonly
believed to be true of man — interacts with the properties and relationships
commonly believed to be true of Wolf to produce new meaning.38 The
comparison is not between actual properties but instead between the concepts
32. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex
Shape the Adversary System, 10 Wis. Women’s L.J. 225 (1995) for an argument that the metaphor
shapes the adversary system and affects those who work within it.
33. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 4.
34. Terence Hawkes, Metaphor 1 (Methuen & Co. 1972).
35. Johnson, supra n. 13, at 24-27.
36. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra note 6, at 15-16
37. Richards, supra n. 3, at 93. See also Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and
Linguistic Structure 13-14 (Clarendon Press 1987) (suggesting that the interactionist theory should
be called perspectival because metaphor’s function is “to provide a perspective from which to
gain an understanding of that which is metaphorically portrayed.”)
38. Black, supra n. 1, at 39-44.
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that the terms of the metaphor call to mind. Rather than comparing objects
to determine what is the same, Black suggests that we use an entire system of
commonplaces to filter or screen or organize our conception or our
perspective of some other system.39 The metaphor selects, emphasizes,
suppresses, and organizes features of Man by implying statements about Man
that normally apply to Wolf.40 In the interaction view, what is expressed by
metaphor can be expressed in no other way; the combination results in a new
and unique meaning rather than a mere reflection of something else. Because
of this complex interaction, paraphrase does not capture the same insight.41
Most recently, Lakoff and Johnson sketched an overall theory suggesting
that metaphor works because it is absorbed through long, constant, and
unconscious experience. 42 Just by living in the world, people absorb a system
of primary metaphors — automatically and involuntarily.43 Understanding
comes about through interaction and negotiation with the physical
environment and with other people. Our bodies and our physical and cultural
environment structure our experience. As experience recurs, categories are
formed. These categories and “gestalts” give us a sense of coherence. Some
gestalts come directly from prior interactions with and in the physical
environment, but we can understand a new experience metaphorically by
using a gestalt from one domain to provide a structure for an experience in
another.44
Metaphor is a projection and an expansion: “To conceive of
understanding as grasping, for example, is to gain a sense of ‘grasp’ as a
cognitive operation without losing or supplanting its physical meaning.” 45
Metaphor is imaginative rationality46 because it brings together the reasoning
processes of categorization and inference with the capacity to see one thing as
another.47
3. Why is metaphor a powerful persuasive tool?
What we “know” from experience is believed more deeply than anything
we learn by listening or reading. Metaphor is persuasive because it draws on

39. Id.
40. Id. at 44-45.
41. Id. at 46. A contemporary of Black’s, Donald Davidson, claimed to the contrary:
“metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing
more.” Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, Critical Inquiry 31, 32 (Autumn 1978),
reprinted in On Metaphor 29 (Sheldon Sacks ed., U. of Chicago Press 1978).
42. Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, supra n. 6, at 47.
43. Id.
44. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 230.
45. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 65.
46. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 193.
47. Imagination is the necessary link that explains how through metaphor, “[t]hings or
ideas which were remote appear now as close.” Paul Ricoeur, The Metaphorical Process as
Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling, in On Metaphor, supra n. 41, at 141, 145-57.
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tacit knowledge that has been embedded through unavoidable and repeated
experience:
[B]y functioning normally in the world, we automatically and
unconsciously acquire and use a vast number of [primary] metaphors.
Those metaphors are realized in our brains physically and are mostly
beyond our control. They are a consequence of the nature of our
brains, our bodies, and the world we inhabit.48
Although many concepts are literal, such as a “cup” as the object you drink
from or “to grasp” as the action of holding, such literal concepts have only a
skeletal structure without metaphor.49
Because a particular metaphor is physically, environmentally, and
culturally embedded, it may be more or less persuasive in certain times and
places. So, for instance, the inhabitants of a planet without gravity would not
understand the primary metaphor that Good is Up. A person living outside a
market-based economy would not appreciate a complex metaphorical system
based on a marketplace of ideas.
Given an appropriately embedded metaphor, the metaphor can import an
organizational structure that is not already there.50 When seeking to
understand a new concept or to persuade another about a particular view of
that concept, the power to impose a preferred organizational structure is
important because we understand best within a context of structures and
categories. Metaphor also supplies options.51 While other organizational
schema provide frameworks, a metaphorical system can create and fill in all
the slots in the schema. In addition to structure, metaphor influences
reasoning because it allows us to borrow patterns of inference and methods of
evaluation from the source and transfer them to the target.52
Finally, metaphor derives much of its persuasive power from the
quietness of its presence; unlike an announced position, it is hard to question
a position based on assumptions that are rooted in entrenched, but unnoticed
metaphors.53 We understand and reason by drawing on an inventory of
structures such as schemas and metaphors. These structures work well
because they operate “constantly, unconsciously, and automatically.”54 To the
extent that we use a conceptual schema or a conceptual metaphor, we have
already accepted its validity. When someone else uses it, we are predisposed
to accept its validity. Barely noticed, very conventionalized schemas and
metaphors are rarely questioned. 55
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Lakoff & Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, supra n. 6, at 59.
Id. at 58-59.
Lakoff & Turner, More than Cool Reason, supra n. 6, at 63-65.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id.
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C. Supporting the legal extension
For lawyers, the cognitive theory of metaphor promises to make law
shaping more imaginative, more human, and more flexible. Like others,
many legal thinkers have treated metaphor with skepticism, believing that it is
an “imprecise and inessential rhetorical embellishment whose principal, if not
only, purpose is to emphasize a logical point and make it more memorable.”56
By explaining that legal reasoning emerges from basic human capacities, the
cognitive theory of metaphor makes legal reasoning more comprehensible. 57
Legal concepts are neither “literal, context-free principles” nor “arbitrary or
radically subjective social constructions.”58 Instead of discovering objective
legal rules or concocting subjective ones, we derive legal rules within a
complex community. The rules are constrained by the community’s history,
culture, norms, institutions, and practices, but the rules also are flexible and
able to evolve in response to changes in human and community conditions.59
Cognitive theory can help lawyers re-focus on the interaction between
two components of judicial decision making: creation of categories and
interpretation of rules.60 According to the fundamentalist view, categories
arise logically and rationally; we designate their common properties and then
classify things in that way. Categories are “descriptive, definitional, and rigidly
bounded.”61
In contrast, recent empirical evidence suggests that category formation is
much more imaginative and flexible. 62 First, instead of definitional categories,
Lakoff found that many categories are radial, consisting of “a central model or
case with various extensions that, though related to the central case in some
fashion, nevertheless cannot be generated by rule. Because they may derive
from the central case in different ways, the extensions may have little or
nothing in common with each other beyond their shared connection to the
central case.”63 Second, rather than the traditional “P or not P” view — an
item either falls within or outside a category — many categories are marked by
prototypes, and category decisions are not all or nothing. That is, some
category members are “more P” than others: James Bond is a more
prototypical bachelor than Tarzan or the Pope.64 This is so because of an

56. Frost, supra n. 13, at 132-34 (describing treatises that dismiss the contributions of
metaphor to legal reasoning).
57. Johnson, supra n. 12, at 952.
58 Id.
59. Id.
60. A critic of applying cognitive research to law contends that empirical insights cannot
yield answers to the philosophical question of how to understand and characterize mental
phenomena and that they appear to be of little help in understanding how to be a better lawyer.
Dennis Patterson, Fashionable Nonsense: Book Review Essay, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 841 (2003).
61. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 69.
62 See generally id. at 69-86.
63. Id. at 71 (relying on Lakoff, Women, Fire, supra n. 6, at 91-114).
64. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 85-86.
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“idealized and conventionalized knowledge structure” in which bachelorhood
is a category for unmarried men only within the right context.65
Third, categories are created and rules are interpreted within larger
systems, which Lakoff calls “idealized cognitive models.”66 An idealized
cognitive model is a folk theory or cultural model that is used to organize
knowledge. These highly generalized models are grounded in or draw upon
direct physical or cultural knowledge; they are idealized because they do not
exactly fit actual situations but they capture our normal expectations as they
have been shaped by the environment and our cultural practices and
conditions;67 they produce prototype effects. The model allows for inferential
connections between many concepts by means of a single structure that is
meaningful as a whole. For example, the words buy, sell, cost, are made
meaningful by the model of a commercial transaction that relates them
together as a structural activity. The use of any of these words evokes an
entire picture.68
The typical features of an idealized cognitive model include (1)
ontological or “being” entities (actors, objects, places, events, states, actions);
(2) properties of those entities; (3) time sequences of events and actions; (4)
internal structure of events; (5) causal relations between events; and (6) other
patterns of inferences and relations among the entities. 69 To illustrate,
referring to cyberspace as a place leads to a network of “entailments”:
“cyberspace is like the physical world and can be zoned, trespassed upon,
interfered with, and divided up into a series of small landholdings.” 70
Similarly, the marketplace of ideas entails a variety of speakers, listeners,
arguments, debates, openings, closings, claims, responses, buyers, sellers,
markets, products, competition, regulation, free trade. These models affect
how we categorize and reason about categories. Because even the simplest
rule makes sense only “against the backdrop of a massive cultural tableau that
provides the tacit background assumptions that render it intelligible,”71 these
models also affect how we interpret rules.
These concepts matter to lawyers because they affect their understanding
of the law, their analytical ability to critique arguments,72 and their imaginative
ability to craft arguments. Metaphoric language helps both writers and readers
think differently about a subject; it thus aids in invention as well as in
clarifying an argument. Metaphor helps persuasion by leading an audience to
65. Lakoff, Women, Fire, supra n. 6, at 70-71.
66. Id. at 68-76.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 88.
69. Id.
70. Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 Cal. L. Rev.
439, 472 (2003)
71. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 101-03 (explaining how we know, without
having to think about it, that humans are not animals for purposes of the rule prohibiting “live
animals on the bus”).
72. See Winter, Standing, supra n. 6 (using cognitive theory to “map the underlying
conceptual structure of standing law”).
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see resemblances and patterns and to make inferences where they might not
otherwise be revealed.
Because a metaphor is inherently open to
interpretation, metaphors can be used to advance uncertain or contradictory
ideas.73 Such “cloaked imprecision” is part of metaphor’s appeal and its
peril.74
III. Evolution of a metaphor: an artificial entity becomes a person
protected by the First Amendment
The marketplace of ideas in which corporations speak is so central to
First Amendment doctrine that it is necessary to remind ourselves that these
concepts derive from metaphor: “[t]o ascribe to . . . artificial entities an
‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse
metaphor with reality.”75 So conventionalized is the market metaphor that it
is difficult to discuss free speech values in the United States without referring
to competition among speakers, free trade in ideas, and the power of thought
to be accepted in the market. This section examines the contribution of these
metaphors to the development of First Amendment protection for corporate
speech.
Given a metaphorical target on which the economic market’s structure
and assumptions have been mapped, it seems only natural to treat a
corporation as an equal competitor. Thus, Justice Stevens, in his concurring
opinion to an order dismissing certiorari in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,76 often referred
to the corporation as having person-like qualities: Nike was besieged with
allegations and responded to charges; Nike was participating in a public
debate about Nike as a good corporate citizen.77
The metaphorical grant of personhood to corporations has some backing.
Treating an object or an abstraction as a person is a basic conceptual
metaphor; it allows us to comprehend unfamiliar experiences in terms of
familiar “human motivations, characteristics, and activities.”78 Linguistic
analysis indicates that referring to a corporation as if it were a single unit is in
line with the way humans generally conceive of institutions made up of a
number of individuals.79 Moreover, personification “works” to some extent;
it may seem fair, for example, to make a corporation that does business in a
state subject to jurisdiction in that state.80 But as the metaphor becomes
73. Zlotnick, supra n. 7, at 1007-08.
74. Id. at 1008 n. 263.
75. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Commn., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
76. 539 U.S. 654, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
77. 123 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
78. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 33.
79. Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 Tul. L.
Rev. 563, 595 (1987); see also Charles D. Watts, Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment:
Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 317, 322-25 (1991).
80. Schane, supra n. 79, at 569-72.
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entrenched, it entails many assumptions: a corporation can be somewhere; it
can act and move, sue and be sued; it can see, hear, speak; it can perceive and
understand; it can formulate ideas and adopt views; it can express those ideas
and views. And because it can do all these human things, the corporation
must be treated as an equal participant in the free market of ideas.
A. Theories of corporate being
Because an abstraction cannot sue or be sued, the corporation had to
become some “thing.” For legal purposes, as John Dewey wrote, using the
word “person” to stand for a corporation could have meant nothing more
than designating it as a unit with rights and obligations, with the extent of
each right and obligation to be determined by its fit with the nature and
characteristics of the unit.81 This approach could award corporations and
other entities legal capacity but still allow courts to make distinctions so that
corporations would be treated as persons in some respects and as nonpersons for other purposes.82 Because it does not assume that these entities
are persons in all respects, such a theory is more useful than those theories
that carry their own consequences; it allows the decision-maker “to reject
some undesirable consequences of legal personality.”83
Instead of such an approach, three inherently consequential theories of
corporate being have been followed: treating the corporation as an artificial
entity that is a creature of the state; treating the corporation as a group
aggregating a number of individuals; and treating the corporation as a real and
discrete entity similar to a person.84
Viewed as an artificial entity that is purely a creation of state statute, the
corporation receives little First Amendment protection; free speech values in
corporate expression are limited to the public interest in the free exchange of
ideas, and limits on corporate speech might well be acceptable. Under the
artificial entity theory, judicial decisions were based primarily on the
corporation’s relationship with the state. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, for example, the Supreme Court limited the corporation’s power to
the original charter granted by the state: “A Corporation is an artificial being,
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very
existence.”85

81. John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655, 656
(1926).
82. Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 216 L.Q. Rev. 494, 511 (1938).
83. Id. at 512.
84. In corporations scholarship, the current metaphor apparently frames the corporation
as a “nexus of contracts.” See generally Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor
in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 779 (2002).
85. 17 U.S. 518, 636-37 (1819).
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Viewed as a group of individuals or as a real and discrete entity with
attributes similar to those of a person, a corporation gains First Amendment
rights that are indistinguishable from those of individuals.86 Under the group
theory, courts emphasize that human individuals constitute the corporation,
with the corporation protecting those individuals’ rights.87
The third approach treats the corporation as an autonomous and real
entity, separate from its creation by the state and from the individuals who
work for it. Without examination, the Supreme Court has consistently
followed this approach to corporate property rights.88 In the case cited for
establishing the principle that a corporation is a person, Santa Clara County
sued a railroad company for failure to pay taxes. The railroad argued six
defenses, including that corporations were persons.89 One of the other five
defenses was found successful. Although not included in the reported
opinion, Chief Justice Waite apparently told the attorneys waiting to hear the
opinion that the court “does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution . . .
applies to these corporations. We are of opinion that it does.”90 Because the
court reporter included a commentary note stating that the defendant
corporations were persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the case now stands for a longestablished proposition: that corporations are persons. 91
More debate accompanied the extension of individual liberty rights to
corporate persons.92 In the 19th century, courts usually rejected attempts to
grant corporations rights that seemed to derive from exclusively human
interests. In the 20th century, though some justices pointed out the irony of
extending to corporations the protections that were intended to eliminate
racial discrimination,93 the Supreme Court incrementally did so. Corporations
count as persons for the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double
jeopardy, and the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury in civil cases. 94
86. Watts, supra n. 79, at 362-63.
87. See e.g. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809) (rejecting the argument that
corporations were citizens within the meaning of the Constitution but allowing corporate
litigants to plead as parties for federal diversity purposes).
88. Watts, supra n. 79, at 336-40.
89. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
90. See Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of
Human Rights 104 (Rodale 2002).
91. Id. at 107-09.
92. Student Author, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a
Legal Fiction, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1745, 1751-52 (2001).
93. See e.g. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 563, 578 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Black, fewer than one-half of one percent of the cases in which the Court had applied
the Fourteenth Amendment invoked it in protection of African-Americans; in more than 50
percent, the plaintiffs asked that its benefits be extended to corporations. Id. at 89-90.
94. See the cases listed in Student Author, supra n. 92, at 1752 n. 49 and Carl J. Mayer,
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L.J. 577, 664-65 (1990).
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Whether viewed as metaphor or as a convenient legal fiction, this concept has
grown “to influence or even control how we think or refuse to think about
basic matters.”95
B. Theories of corporate speaking
In its early applications, the First Amendment protected individuals with
unpopular or dissenting views. Under current commercial speech doctrine,
the First Amendment protects the speech rather than the speaker.
The first step in this evolution was to assume that there are only two
categories of speakers, private speakers and the government, and that the First
Amendment is intended to protect all private speakers against government
regulation.96 If those assumptions are true, corporations must fall into the
private category and be protected the same as any other speaker, either
because the corporation is a person or because the corporation is a group of
persons. As the Supreme Court said in Central Hudson, a corporation’s
advertising can be viewed as “expression by an informed and interested group
of persons of their point of view.”97
The next step was to assume that spending money is protected speech
because it is one way to speak. Without this equation of speech and money,
“an issue might have arisen as to whether [or how] a corporation even could
speak.”98 Third, through the market metaphor, the rights of listeners became
as important as the rights of speakers. By taking these three steps, the
Supreme Court moved from protecting the rights of individuals to speak
freely to protecting speech itself, thus supporting the free market of
information by prohibiting the government from limiting the stock of
information available to consumers and voters. 99
As a result, although in 1942 the Court had ruled that “the Constitution
imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising,”100 by 1976 the Court was extending First Amendment protection
to the communication, its source, and its recipients because “the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable to the functioning of a free market
economy.”101 The flow of information to consumers remains the primary
rationale for protecting corporate speech; this is so even though advertising
research suggests that providing information is not the best way to persuade
consumers to buy.102
95. Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 871, 877 (1986).
96. Greenwood, supra n. 8, at 1014-20.
97. Central Hudson v. Public Service Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 581 (1980).
98. Greenwood, supra n. 8, at 1015.
99. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 783
(1976).
100. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
101. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
102. Sarah C. Haan, Student Author, The ‘Persuasion Route’ of the Law: Advertising and Legal
Persuasion, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1281, 1297-98 (2000).
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In First National Bank v. Bellotti,103 the Court explicitly held that the First
Amendment protects corporate speech by relying on the rights of listeners in
the market. In Bellotti, a state criminal statute prohibited corporate
contributions or expenditures to influence referenda not affecting the
corporation’s business or assets. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
rephrased the question; it was not whether corporations have First
Amendment rights. Instead, because the First Amendment “serves significant
societal interests,” the question was whether the Massachusetts statute
“abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect” or
“whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech
of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection.”104 Because
speech about the referendum issue was core First Amendment speech, “[t]he
inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.”105 Justice Powell acknowledged that some
“purely personal guarantees” of the constitution were limited to individuals106
but was unswayed by Justice White’s argument that “what some have
considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of
communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and selffulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech.”107
After Bellotti, protected speech included a corporation’s spending of
money for lobbying, political advertisements, and other attempts to influence
the political process.108 Only in the area of contributions and spending
directly associated with political campaigns are corporations found to have
speech rights derivative of and different from those of citizens.109
103. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
104. Id. at 775.
105. Id. at 777.
106. Id. at 778 n. 4.
107. Id. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting).
108. See Martin H. Redish & Howard W. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 243 (1998) (arguing
that the Court’s decisions protecting corporate speech are a better fit with First Amendment
theory than the campaign financing decisions which have shown some “hesitancy to protect
profitmaking corporate speech”).
109. See Student Author, Free Speech Protections for Corporations: Competing in the Markets of
Commerce and Ideas, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2272 (2004) (noting that commercial speech appears to
have gained greater protection even as the Supreme Court approves greater regulation of
corporate political speech). In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the
Court upheld limitations on corporate political contributions and spending. Worried about the
immense wealth of corporations and about protecting shareholders, a majority in Austin said
that a corporation’s First Amendment rights are not the same as individuals’ and upheld the
state statute precluding corporations from making contributions to or independent
expenditures on behalf of state political candidates. 494 U.S. at 657-66. In McConnell v. Federal
Election Commn., 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003), the Court — in six opinions covering 133 pages —
upheld legislation limiting campaign spending by corporations and national political parties. In
Federal Election Commn. v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003), where a nonprofit advocacy
corporation challenged restrictions on corporate spending and contributions, a majority found
corporate contributions to warrant less protection “since corporations’ First Amendment
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C. Metaphors for free expression
Just as corporations were not always persons protected by the First
Amendment, First Amendment values were not always viewed through the
prism of the free market. John Milton expressed the relationship between
truth and falsehood as a battle between foes, as in the primary metaphor that
Argument is War; he also characterized truth as a free flowing stream of
information, echoing the primary metaphor that Knowledge is Water. 110 John
Stuart Mill used the battle metaphor, recognizing that the concept that truth
always triumphs “is one of those pleasant falsehoods . . . which all experience
refutes.”111 Nonetheless, the result of silencing expression is “that it is
robbing the human race . . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost
as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.”112
This “truth-based conception of free speech, organized around the ‘free
flow’ and ‘open encounter’ metaphors, provided only a limited model for First
Amendment doctrine.”113 Dissenting from the affirmance of a conviction
under the espionage act, Justice Holmes wrote that “the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”114 Although Justice Holmes wrote about the “free trade in ideas”
and “the competition of the market” in 1919, it was Justice Brennan who first
wrote about the “marketplace of ideas” in 1965.115 At least one author
believes that the change was significant. “Brennan localized the metaphor; he
gave the market a sense of place. Brought down from the Holmesian skies,
the marketplace of ideas grounds ‘free trade’ in a specific locale and context. .
. . [It] connotes diversity and pluralism at ground level without resting on
theories of abstract, truth-generating invisible hands.”116
Although the metaphor was new, it contained basic conceptual
metaphors, the Mind is a Container and Ideas are Objects. These basic
metaphors in turn help generate new and different metaphors when the writer
specifies a particular container or object such as The mind is a machine,
speech and association interests are derived largely from those of their members and of the
public in receiving information.” Id. at 2210 n. 8 (citations omitted).
110. See Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 267, 397 n. 23 (quoting John Milton,
Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To the Parliament of England (1644) in The
Prose of John Milton 265, 31 (J.M. Patrick ed., 1967)).
111. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 30-31 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge U. Press 1989).
112. Id. at 20.
113. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 268.
114. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
115. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (“It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”).
116. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 1986
Yale L.J. 886, 894. See also Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions 49-72 (S. Ill.
U. Press 1992).
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ideas are products.117 They then combine with the economic experience of
the market to “entail” a whole set of associations and inferences: “ideas are
commodities; persuasion is selling; speakers are vendors; members of the
audience are potential purchasers; acceptance is buying; intellectual value is
monetary value; and the struggle for recognition in the domain of public
opinion is like competition in the market.”118 The marketplace metaphor
carries over from the source domain of economic activity the idea that value
can be measured by demand as well as the “cultural values of freedom and
individual autonomy that constitute our modern notion of free trade.”119
The market metaphor is so common that its new-ness is surprising.
Although some authors attribute the metaphor to Milton, he used the market
image much differently to argue against licensed printing: “truth and
understanding are not such wares as to be monopoliz’d and traded in by
tickets and statutes, and standards.”120 The current market metaphor emerged
from a particular time and place. Justice Holmes envisioned a free trade in
ideas at a time of laissez faire capitalism, when people might easily accept that
truth, like economic progress, could emerge from market competition.
“Thus, the discontinuity between the framers’ First Amendment (with its
focus on the prohibition of prior restraints and the introduction of truth as a
defense to charges of seditious libel) and the modern First Amendment (with
its more libertarian emphasis) is a function of the radically different social
contexts and the distinctive concepts they each make possible.”121 The
Holmes’ concept that competing ideas and robust debate will lead to the
discovery of truth has been joined in the marketplace by images of debate as
essential to self-government.122
D. Why the metaphors matter
Personhood has been “a conclusion, not a question.”123 Referring
metaphorically to the corporation as a person allows the decision-maker to
treat the corporation as if it were identical for all purposes to individual
human beings. Referring metaphorically to the marketplace of ideas suggests
that the corporation needs protection from government regulation because its
voice is necessary to the debate from which truth will emerge.
Because personhood provides a simple answer to the question of how to
regard a corporation, it diverts attention away from the differences among

117. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest, supra n. 6, at 271.
118. Id. at 272.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Milton, supra n. 110, at 303-04).
121. Id. at 273.
122. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L.J. 1, 3-4.
123. Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of
Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1466 (1992).
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forms of organization and from the different treatments that should result. 124
Instead of considering complex questions and making relevant distinctions,
decision-makers simply apply to institutions the ideas and rules that grew out
of an individualistic context.125 Moreover, the declaration of personhood not
only carries rights and obligations but also shapes social values and can
diminish the rights of others.126 Conferring Bill of Rights protections on
corporations legitimizes various acts and functions of corporations. This
message reflects existing values, influences future behaviors, and generates
new values. Finally, granting corporations such protection poses a greater
danger if “the extension of corporate constitutional rights [becomes] a zerosum game that diminishes the rights and power of real individuals.” If that is
the case, “[t]he corporate exercise of first amendment rights frustrates the
individual’s right to participate equally in democratic elections, to pay
reasonable utility rates, and to live in a toxin-free environment.” 127
As for why corporate personhood is inappropriate for First Amendment
purposes, scholars have suggested many reasons. First and most important,
protecting corporate speech fails to advance the purposes of freedom of
expression: “assuring individual self-fulfillment,” “advancing knowledge and
discovering truth,” participating in “decision making by all members of
society,” and “achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable
Each of these values is “predictably promoted by
community.”128
guaranteeing the individual liberties.”129
Individual self-realization and self-determination are not furthered by
corporate speech.130 Because corporate speech is in some instances required
by law, it cannot be regarded as a result of autonomous decisions.131 When
the individual liberty value does not apply, “the First Amendment interest
[should be] limited to the artifact of the speech itself and . . . made subject to
the larger governmental regulatory objectives related to accuracy, equality,
124. Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society
44 (U. of Cal. Press 1986).
125. Id. at 5.
126. Student Author, supra n. 92, at 176.
127. Mayer, supra n. 94, at 658.
128. Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-9 (Random House 1970); see
also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 255
(protection is focused on “thought and communication by which we ‘govern’ ” ); Vincent Blasi,
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521, 527 (protection is
intended to check “abuse of power by public officials”); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A
Philosophical Enquiry 81-86 (Cambridge U. Press 1982) (protection based mostly on distrust of
governmental power).
129. C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 47-48 (Oxford U. Press 1989).
130. See Greenwood, supra n. 8, at 1055-67; see also Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless
Persons: The Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 763, 779,
804-11 (arguing that the character evidence rule should not be applied to corporations because
its purpose is to protect autonomy and dignity interests not shared by corporations).
131. Greenwood, supra n. 8, at 1002. Greenwood argues that publicly traded business
corporations “are legally and practically barred from speaking on behalf of any human being.”
Id. at 1003.
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fairness, access, and utility.”132 Given that the corporate right derives from
the listeners’ rights, it is at least possible that the free flow of information and
debate necessary for enlightened self-government would be improved if the
government suppressed some corporate statements.133
Second, corporations are properly viewed as the objects of political
actions, not the subjects, and so are not the kinds of political actors crucial to
democratic self-government.134 Third, the Court has assumed that the
corporation needs protection from the state rather than examining corporate
functioning and corporate law and then making a considered judgment about
whether constitutional norms designed to protect individuals from the state
should apply as well to powerful organizations.135 Fourth, large business
corporations are not groups of individuals who have joined together for the
purpose of individual expression and they are not intended to be instruments
of such expression.136
Like the assumption of corporate personhood, unquestioning acceptance
of the market metaphor carries significant consequences. For example, Prof.
Cass Sunstein believes that the marketplace metaphor is inconsistent with the
conditions required for democratic self-government. Under the model of an
economic market, “American law protects much speech that ought not to be
protected. It safeguards speech that has little or no connection with
democratic aspirations and that produces serious social harm.”137 Others
believe that the structure and operation of the market dims its claim to
provide and protect a range of voices: “the marketplace’s inevitable bias
supports entrenched power structures or ideologies. . . . [P]rotection of
expression alone does not guarantee an environment where new ideas,
perceptions, and values can develop.”138 Moreover, because corporate actions
reflect the expression of only those persons who control the corporation,
“[t]o permit unrestricted corporate speech is to grant to certain individuals a
special state-created mechanism for speaking.”139
Once corporations are assumed to be the same as other marketplace
actors, equal treatment is required. Various Supreme Court justices have
declared that they are unable to differentiate between individuals and

132. Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 781 (1995).
133. Greenwood, supra n. 8, at 1069.
134. Id. at 1001.
135. Id. at 1006-08.
136. Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 790 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 39-79 (2001) (pointing
out that a large publicly held corporation and a closely held corporation may be completely
different in the extent to which shareholders and other corporate constituents participate in
decisions).
137. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, xviii (The Free Press 1993).
138. Ingber, supra n. 122, at 85-86.
139. William Patton & Randall Bartlett, Corporate ‘Persons’ and Freedom of Speech: The Political
Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 494, 497.
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institutions or among different kinds of institutions140 or to restrict the speech
of some “to enhance the relative voice of others.”141 Justice Brennan wrote
that any such distinction among institutions is “irreconcilable with the
fundamental First Amendment principle that ‘[t]he inherent worth of . . .
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union or
individual.”142 Once the speaker is entitled to neutral treatment, the state
cannot regulate because “[t]he very purpose of the First Amendment is to
foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind
through regulating the press, speech, and religion.”143
This neutrality principle supports the argument that corporations must be
protected persons under the First Amendment: refusing to protect them
would subject newspapers, magazines, book publishers, and other similar
corporations to restrictions on their publications. This problem could be
avoided if, for example, the Court were to adopt Justice Potter Stewart’s
position that the Press Clause is a structural provision designed to protect an
institution that serves a particular function in self-governance.144 In that way,
even if most corporate statements were excluded from First Amendment
protection under the free speech clause, media corporations could still be
protected under the freedom of the press clause. Most justices have, however,
rejected any claim that media corporations can receive any greater protection
than other corporations.145
Those who favor First Amendment protection for corporations rely on
the value of the information they bring to the market: corporations are said to
have a greater interest in and more knowledge and expertise about
government actions on issues such as the economy. “To exclude corporate
expression from the scope of the free speech clause, then, would be unwisely
to shut out from public debate a substantial amount of relevant, provocative,
and potentially vital information and opinion on issues of fundamental
importance to the polity.”146 Nonetheless, protection of corporate speech is
based almost entirely on the rights of listeners. Because the corporation has
no independent rights, “there is nothing to protect corporate speech against
limitations whose purpose is to promote the listeners’ First Amendment
interests.”147 Because the corporate right is derivative, its purpose is to
140. But see Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 84 (1998) (suggesting that First Amendment protection for governmental institutions
should depend on their particular characteristics); Bezanson, supra n. 132 (proposing different
protection for individual speech than for institutional speech produced by organizations and
corporations)
141. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
142. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 780 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).
143. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
144. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975).
145. See e.g. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 797-802 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
146. Redish & Wasserman, supra n. 108, at 236.
147. Dan-Cohen, supra n. 124, at 109-10.
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safeguard the rights of others. If protection of corporate statements is found
to be ineffective, “it can always be discarded in favor of better ways to attain
the same goals.”148 So, for example, when a regulation is designed to protect
the interests of listeners, it should be reviewed less stringently because
corporate speech protection is based on the same listeners’ interests.149 In
Bellotti, for example, the government argued that corporate speech should be
limited because corporate wealth and size threatened to drown out other
views and thus to undermine the role of the individual in the electoral
process.150
IV. Uncovering metaphor
Corporations like Nike rely on “hired metaphorists” whose job it is “to
make some possession stand for happiness or well-being.”151 Beginning in the
1990s, critics of Nike’s labor practices in foreign countries urged boycotts
endangering such persuasive efforts. One critic took advantage of California’s
laws allowing private individuals to sue to enforce prohibitions against false
advertising and unfair competition.152
In Kasky v. Nike, Marc Kasky alleged “that Nike, for the purpose of
inducing consumers to buy its products, made false representations of fact
about the conditions under which they are made.”153 According to Kasky’s
brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, Nike made six false representations in news
releases and letters to editors and collegiate athletic program directors: (1)
“that its products are manufactured in compliance with applicable local laws
and regulations governing wages and working hours”; (2) “that the average
line-workers in the factories are paid double the applicable local minimum
wage”; (3) “that the workers receive free meals and health care”; (4) “that
Nike ‘guarantee[s] a living wage for all workers’ ”; (5) “that the workers are
protected from corporal punishment and abuse”; and (6) “that working
conditions in the factories are in compliance with applicable local laws and
regulations governing occupational health-and-safety and environmental
standards.”154
Whether part of a political debate or not, each of these representations is
the kind of statement that can, more or less, be proven true or false. They
therefore seem subject to testing under the California statutes that proscribe
“unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and the dissemination of
148. Id. at 110.
149. Id. at 111.
150. 435 U.S. at 787-89. As noted earlier, this argument was successful in later campaign
financing cases. See supra n. 109.
151. Wayne C. Booth, Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation, in On Metaphor, supra n.
41, at 47, 67.
152. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §§ 17200, 17500 (West 2002).
153. Br. of Respt. at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL
1844849) [hereinafter Br. of Respt.].
154. Id. at 4-5.
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any statements that are “untrue or misleading.”155 This language has been
interpreted to bar “not only advertising which is false, but advertising, which
although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood,
or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.”156
Nike’s lawyers demurred to the complaint on First Amendment and other
grounds, claiming that its statements were absolutely protected as part of a
debate about a public issue.157 The Superior Court sustained the demurrer
and dismissed the lawsuit; the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
dismissal. The California Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Nike’s
representations were commercial speech and thus subject to regulation
because “the messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker to a
commercial audience, and . . . they made representations of fact about the
speaker’s own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its
products.”158 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; thirty-four briefs,
including thirty-one amicus briefs, were filed159 and oral arguments were
heard; several months later, the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted;160 the parties subsequently settled, with Nike agreeing to pay $1.5
million to an advocacy group.161
While Kasky, the consumer critic, could have portrayed the lawsuit as a
struggle between truth and falsehood or a narrative of David challenging
Goliath, Nike’s lawyers and its supporters metaphorically cast the case as an
attempt to hobble one speaker in a debate on a public issue. In this debate,
Nike was not only a speaker with a right to express its views and ideas, but a
uniquely knowledgeable speaker with important and valuable information that
would otherwise be withheld from listeners. Even though Nike “spent almost
$1 billion ‘to promote, advertise and market’ its products” in 1997,162 the
briefs of Nike and its supporters expressed concern that Nike might be placed
at a competitive disadvantage if the California statutes were to be applied.
Nike’s consumer critics would not have to be truthful in their statements
(apparently assuming that Nike’s lawyers could not establish the elements of
defamation) while the California statute would allow Nike to be found liable
for false and misleading statements disseminated on its behalf.
Even though the California Supreme Court decision had seemed on the
verge of deciding that some kinds of speakers were less protected, both
parties assumed in the U.S. Supreme Court that Nike was a speaker whose
155. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §§ 17200, 17500.
156. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 948 (2002).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 946.
159. For a study of the influence of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court, see Joseph
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicu Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000).
160. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
161. Nike Settles Lawsuit Over Labor Claims: The company will pay $1.5 million in a case that used
California law to contest the firm’s statements, L.A. Times C1 (Sept. 13, 2003).
162. Br. of Respt., supra n. 153, at 2.
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representations might be protected by the First Amendment. Briefs
supporting Nike relied on its personhood to blur or obliterate any distinction
between a corporation such as Nike and an individual or a group of
individuals who had banded together for political purposes; they used the
market metaphor to liken Nike’s role in the marketplace to the media’s
watchdog function and to argue that any error in Nike’s representations would
be corrected by other speakers in the market. Briefs supporting Kasky,
although often accepting the speaking role Nike assigned itself, sought to
restrict the protection of the marketplace of ideas to truthful commercial
speech.
A. The corporation as a person
Some briefs depicted Nike “as” any other speaker, and in particular, as
some of the more celebrated protest speakers of the past. Linking the
personhood and market metaphors, Nike’s own brief most often portrayed
the corporation as a participant in a public debate.
1. The corporation as indistinguishable from other protected speakers
Amicus briefs filed on behalf of Nike depict the corporation “as” other
protected speakers, from the founding fathers who had commercial interests,
to the publishers of an advertisement in the New York Times protesting a
“wave of terror” during the civil rights protests, to the NAACP in its
encouragement of a boycott against discriminatory merchants and the labor
union organizers who organized boycotts and urged union membership. 163
These briefs erase distinctions between corporations and individuals, between
corporations and groups which have banded together specifically for speech
purposes, and between corporations and the newspapers which publish
individuals’ speech.
First, Nike is portrayed “as” an individual speaker with commercial
interests. According to the brief filed by the Business Roundtable,164 the
question presented is whether “self-interested commercial speakers”
should be able to take part in public debate. The answer comes from
American tradition: “From the Stamp Act to the debate over the structure and
ratification of the Constitution, many of the most prominent contributors to
the founding generation’s debates were ‘self-interested’ commercial actors
who addressed matters directly affecting their commercial interests.”
Throughout American history, “speakers engaged in commerce,
163. For example, Nike is compared to the organizers of a labor boycott in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); the organizers of a civil rights consumer boycott in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); and the labor organizer who challenged a Texas
statute requiring organizers to register before soliciting workers to join a union, Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
164. Amicus Br. of the Business Roundtable, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(available at 2003 WL 835213) [hereinafter Amicus Br. of the Business Roundtable].
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advancing facts and ideas that promote their economic self-interest, have
long made, and continue to make, valuable contributions to debate on matters
of public concern.”165 Leading up to the Declaration of Independence, British
economic restrictions such as the Proclamation of 1763, the Stamp Act of
1765, the Townshend Act of 1767 resulted in “institutional opposition to
British policies, and the increasing self-identification of the colonists as having
independent political interests.” Included among the “ ‘long train of abuses
and usurpations’ enumerated in the Declaration of Independence were
‘cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world’ and ‘imposing Taxes on us
without our Consent.’ ”166 Speakers with commercial interests were “essential
participants in the resulting political debate. . . . [T]he leading editorialists
were individuals drawn from the commercial and professional classes.”167
The debate about the constitution also involved speakers with commercial
interests. “Included in the Continental Congress and the Constitutional
convention were many landholders, successful merchants, security-holders,
and professionals . . . . [C]ommercial considerations were inseparable from
statements of genuinely held political and ideological views.” 168 Not only are
corporations like these individual commercial actors important throughout
our history, corporations also have taken on the watchdog role that once was
taken by the press: if “corporations were inhibited from speaking freely
on public issues of concern to them — the people would lose an important
counter-weight to the power of government, and the constitutional system of
democratic and political checks and balances would suffer
commensurately.”169
Next, Nike’s brief and several amicus briefs depict Nike “as” the speakers
in New York Times v. Sullivan.170 In New York Times, several individuals and
groups purchased a full-page advertisement in the New York Times protesting
a “wave of terror” against blacks involved in nonviolent civil rights
demonstrations in the south; the advertisement asked for contributions to
continue the fight for racial justice.171 The lawsuit was one of several filed
against large media organizations in Southern states,172 and the Alabama ruling
allowing the suit to go forward was viewed as an attempt to use state law to
regulate media coverage of the desegregationist side of the civil rights
movement.173 Asserting that many of the allegedly factual statements included
in the advertisement were inaccurate, the elected city commissioner of
Montgomery sued the New York Times Co. and four individuals who signed
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
(1983).

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 3.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 278 n. 18.
See Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 603, 605
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the ad. The Supreme Court held that the newspaper could not be found liable
for defamation without proof of what became known as actual malice.
Allowing judgments against the media for mere negligence in publishing
defamatory matter about public officials would interfere with “a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”174
According to the amicus brief filed by three advertising industry trade
organizations, Nike v. Kasky “is one of the most important free speech cases”
since New York Times.175 Nike may be even more deserving of protection
than the New York Times: “Like the New York Times case, there is a claim that
a corporate speaker has used commercial speech. Unlike New York Times . . .
in this case there was no attempt to raise funds, no claim of harm, and the
Petitioner was responding to public statements attacking it.”176 Similarly, the
amicus brief filed by a number of media groups likens Nike to the speakers in
New York Times.177 The lawsuits are similar, according to this brief, because
both were based in part on an editorial advertisement and both were part of a
concerted strategy to chill press coverage of one side of a public debate.
Less directly, another amicus brief also equates Nike’s statements to the
speech of the publishers of books, newspapers, and magazines.178 This brief
argues that the Court has long recognized that “neither a profit motive nor a
corporate source warrants lesser First Amendment protection for the speech
of a business entity.”179 Because “[t]he most frequently invoked premises of
First Amendment protection apply no less clearly when the speaker happens
to be a business entity,”180 the quality of protection for individual and
corporate speakers must be equal. Given that principle of equal treatment,
the California Supreme Court engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination when it “hobbl[ed] the corporate speaker in any debate
over issues of public importance.”181
Third, Nike is described “as” an organization of individuals. In their
opening brief, Nike’s lawyers obliquely claim that Nike’s statements about
working conditions in its factories are indistinguishable from the protest
speech of organizations: “If it were the state’s role to assure that listeners
reach the decisions it regards as best informed, in commerce or elsewhere,
lessened First Amendment protection would necessarily apply to speech
174. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
175. Amicus Br. of the Association of National Advertising et al., at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 835112).
176. Id.
177. Amicus Br. of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcasters, Wire Services,
and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations at 379, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (available at 2003 WL 835613) [hereinafter Amicus Br. of Forty Leading Newspapers].
178. Amici Br. of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression and
the Media Institute at 7, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 1192678)
(relying on Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)).
179. Id. at 7.
180. Id. at 9.
181. Id. at 5.
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intended to encourage consumers to boycott merchants who discriminate
against employees or customers on account of race (but see NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)) . . . .”182
The brief of the Business Roundtable ties individuals with commercial
interests to the corporate form and equates the corporation to the individuals
who formed it: “individuals have long participated in discussion on public
affairs as members and leaders of corporations per se.” Starting with the
Massachusetts Bay Company and the Virginia Company and moving on to the
railroad corporations, “the corporation’s role in coordinating its members’
activities and protecting their interests” deserves protection.183 The media
group brief also attributes Nike’s statements directly to individuals: “Nothing
Inherent in Individuals’ Pursuit of Corporate Interests Justifies Imposing
Special Burdens on Their Ability to Participate in Public Debates.”184 If the
corporation’s statements are in reality the statements of individuals, regulation
of Nike’s speech unconstitutionally benefits the individuals and interest
groups on the other side of the debate. “The First Amendment does not
permit a state to disfavor corporate speech in this manner.”185 Finally, the
amicus brief filed by followers of Ayn Rand claims that the case “directly
challenges the right of individuals, when acting through a corporation, to
engage in unshackled speech on matters related to their economic selfinterest.”186
2. The corporation as a participant in a public debate
In addition to portraying the corporation “as” other speakers, Nike’s
lawyers consistently portray the corporation as a participant in a public
debate.187 Starting with the Questions Presented, the brief asks first, “[w]hen
a corporation participates in a public debate,” may it be subjected to
liability for factual inaccuracies and, second, even if Nike’s speech is
commercial speech, “does the First Amendment . . . permit subjecting
speakers to the legal regime”188 approved by the California Supreme Court. 189
The brief depicts Nike as the focus of a “passionate worldwide debate over
‘globalization.’ ”190 Because of repeated allegations about working conditions
at Nike factories around the world, Nike was subjected to “enormous media
scrutiny and commentary, much of it pointed and vituperative, coupled with
182. Id. at 8.
183. Amicus Br. of the Business Roundtable, supra n. 164, at 9.
184. Amicus Br. of Forty Leading Newspapers, supra n. 177, at 13.
185. Id. at 14.
186. Amicus Br. of the Center for the Advancement of Capitalism at 2, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,
539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 834937).
187. Br. of Pet., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 898993)
[hereinafter Br. of Pet.].
188. Regime appears to be a contrasting metaphor, suggesting an unsavory alternative to
a free market.
189. Br. of Pet., supra n. 187, at i.
190. Id. at 2.
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demands for legislative action.” Nike “found itself responding.” The
corporation purchased editorial advertisements (similar to those protected in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). “Nike officials also
responded to the charges through press releases, letters to the editor and opeds in newspapers around the country, and in letters to officers of national
universities.” The corporation’s “statements conveyed the view that Nike
does act morally.”191
Under accepted commercial speech doctrine, the Nike brief argues that
Nike’s statements were fully protected political speech because the
corporation was participating in a public debate, not advertising a product.
The brief characterizes commercial speech doctrine as having extended “the
First Amendment’s protective ambit . . . to expression that had for some time
been deemed to fall within government’s power to control commerce itself,
and thus had received essentially no First Amendment protection at all.” 192
The brief acknowledges that the extension was based on the speech’s
“constitutionally significant value to listeners” and that commercial speech is
“thought to lack the communicative value of fully protected speech to the
speaker and to society generally and in that sense has been said to make less of
a ‘direct contribution to the interchange of ideas.’ ”193 Ignoring its own
reference to the fully protected speech of “individuals,” the brief argues that
the California decision imperils “speech that contributes to public
understanding of important social issues” and that the decision is unfair to
Nike because its speech is subject to regulation and the speech of its critics is
not.194
As their second argument, Nike’s lawyers assert that “Even As Applied to
Speech Properly Deemed ‘Commercial,’ The Legal Regime the California
Supreme Court Constructed In This Case Stifles Speech In Violation Of The
First Amendment.”195 Because of the broad ruling of the California Supreme
Court, “commercial actors [will be] reticent to speak until they are
virtually certain that all their remarks will in hindsight be found truthful.”196
Not only has Nike already been restrained or chilled from speaking but also
“[e]xpression on matters of corporate responsibility” and on “social,
political, and moral issues” is more likely to be chilled than product
advertising.197 In the end, “the discovery of truth will be the loser” because
the best test of truth is the power to be accepted in the competition of the
market.198

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 25-26
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 50.
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3. The corporation as a manufacturer of images and products
Only one amicus brief, filed in support of Kasky by a group called
ReclaimDemocracy.org, explicitly rejected the corporation as a person
metaphor.199 Because it is a corporation, the brief asserts, Nike’s rights are
different from those of individuals. Moreover, because
Nike is in a unique position to know the truth of its statements and
its communications are unlikely to be chilled by regulation of the
accuracy of statements about its operations[,] . . . [t]o insulate Nike
from liability for intentionally misleading the listening public
regarding its own operations, far from serving the First Amendment,
would instead distort the “marketplace of ideas” that the First
Amendment seeks to protect.200
The brief argues that the doctrine of corporate personhood should be rejected
because “corporations are creatures of state law and should be
subordinate, rather than superior, to the governments that create them and
allow them to do business.”201
To undermine the corporation as a person metaphor, the brief details its
historical and logical shortcomings. The “Court has never provided a
rationale for ‘personifying’ corporations,” and the critical function of the First
Amendment is not served in any way by granting free speech rights to
business corporations: the use of communication as a means of selfexpression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment. Communication by a business
corporation does “not represent a manifestation of individual freedom or
choice,” nor does it “necessarily represent the views of its shareholders, who
do not share and have not invested their money for the advancement of ‘a
common set of political or social views.’ ” 202
Another amicus brief more subtly challenges corporate personhood.
Rather than engaging in speech, this brief describes Nike as “engaged in a
publicity campaign.”203 The brief continues to use metaphors from
activities other than speaking: “Nike Has Manufactured An Image of
Social Responsibility As A Means of Promoting Product Sales”; “Image
Promotion Is An Essential Aspect Of Product Promotion”; and “Nike Has
Cultivated A Corporate Image of Social Progressivity As A Marketing
Tool To Promote Product Sales.”204 Nonetheless, this brief falls back on the
dominant metaphor in its closing:
199. Amicus Br. of Reclaimdemocracy.com, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(available at 2003 WL 1844818).
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id. at 23.
203. Amici Br. of the States of California et al., at 2, Nike, Inc., v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (available at 2003 WL 1844750).
204. Id. at 4-9.
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In speaking to consumers about working conditions in the factories
where its products are made, Nike engaged in speech that is
particularly hardy or durable. Because Nike’s purpose in making
these statements . . . was to maintain its sales and profits, regulation
aimed at preventing false and actually or inherently misleading speech
is unlikely to deter Nike from speaking truthfully or at all.205
B. The marketplace of ideas
Briefs on both sides of the issue relied on the market metaphor to argue
that one outcome or the other would distort the free or the fair operation of
the marketplace. Those on Nike’s side said the market could run best without
government regulation; those on Kasky’s side said the market would be
distorted by false commercial speech.
1. The marketplace of ideas, like the economy, is self-regulating
Once Nike becomes indistinguishable from other speakers and part of a
public debate, the debate itself is protected and the government should not
intervene. The First Amendment presumes “that truth will best emerge from
the ‘collision’ of ideas that results from open channels of communication.”206
As the amicus brief filed by the ACLU indicates, once you accept the dual
metaphors, the outcome is apparent: government, including the courts, should
not interfere with the market. “[C]ourts are not arbitrators of truthfulness or
probity . . . [and] the dispute should be resolved through public debate and
not in a courtroom.”207 Nike stands on equal footing with its critics. “In a
participatory democracy, the First Amendment does not allow the
government to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the people in
evaluating conflicting arguments on matters of public concern.”208
In the market, “[c]orporate speech enriches public debate by
counteracting the dominance of the new media megacorporations, and of
government officials who can command free access to the press.”209 Lesser
protection for commercial speech “allow[s] the government to skew the
democratic process to achieve a preordained result and reflect[s] a mistrust of
citizens’ ability to make personal choices based on free and open debate.”210
205. Id. at 29.
206. Amicus Br. of Pfizer, Inc. at 14-15, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available
at 2003 WL 836067) (urging a constitutional right of reply for commercial entities in debates
over matters of public concern).
207. Amici Br. of the ACLU and the ACLU of Northern Cal. at 3, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 721563).
208. Id. at 16.
209. Amicus Br. of Pacific Legal Foundation et al. at 8, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (available at 2003 WL 835977).
210. Id. at 9.
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The self-correction mechanism of the market will guard against any
dangers associated with allowing Nike’s speech to go unregulated.211 The
media groups who filed in support of Nike describe their common interest in
the case as “enforcing the First Amendment’s prohibition against
governmental interference in public debates.”212 In essence, the brief argues
that if business representatives are deterred from speaking to the media, the
“chilling effect will deprive the public of access to important news stories and
the clash of competing viewpoints.”213 Moreover, the California statutes at
issue threaten the marketplace because they “threaten to distort the businessrelated news that the press continues to cover.”214 In the marketplace, when a
business practice is a matter of public debate, “the media scrutinize corporate
speech and typically place potentially misleading statements into context,
thereby providing timely and corrective information.” In Nike’s case, the
brief contends, “every one of Nike’s allegedly misleading statements either
was never reported or was challenged by counter-speech in the same media
outlets in which they were printed.”215 Thus, the brief concludes, “when a
company’s public statements are designed in part to participate in such public
debates,” the Court should leave policing to “the First Amendment’s
preferred process of investigation, counterspeech and reflection.”216
The brief of the Business Roundtable likewise concludes that “[i]n the
marketplace of ideas, commercial entities frequently vie with editorialists,
public advocacy groups, and other non-governmental entities to compete for
the hearts and minds of the public concerning issues that affect the entities’
economic interests.”217 It would violate the First Amendment’s prohibition
on viewpoint discrimination for the government to permit one side of public
debate — the commercial actor’s critics — to engage in full, wide-open, and
robust debate while subjecting the commercial actor to a different and more
restrictive standard of conduct for speech.218 Eliminating “the voice of
corporations” would augment the government or impoverish the debate. 219
Because the First Amendment protects the rights of commercial actors to
participate fully in debates on matters of public concern,
when a commercial actor makes statements concerning its
business operations as a part of a public policy debate, the state’s
interest in protecting consumers from harm . . . is not properly
advanced by restrictions on corporate speech like those at issue here.
Instead, the vigorous counter-speech of advocacy groups,
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Amici Br. of Forty Leading Newspapers, supra n. 177.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
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reporters, and politicians will aggressively counter the corporate
statements. Indeed, consumers themselves can be expected to
recognize the self-interested component of corporate speech and
discount it accordingly.220
From the other side of the unfair labor practices issue, the amicus brief of
the AFL-CIO also endorses the concept of unfettered debate in the
marketplace.221 “We vigorously assert that Nike is guilty of unfairly exploiting
workers in the production of its goods . . . . [W]e further maintain that Nike’s
public statements . . . [have been] unforthcoming and unresponsive and have
been calculated more to mislead than to inform.”222 Nonetheless, the brief
concludes that the debate, and by extension all its participants, are protected
by the First Amendment. The corporation’s public statements “are part of a
continuing dialogue . . . . Nike’s withdrawal under legal pressure from the
dialogue . . . serves both to diminish the sources of public knowledge about
that matter and to frustrate the debate itself.”223 Once there is a protected
debate, both sides must be protected. “[T]he First Amendment incorporates
Equal Protection Clause principles in order to provide a check against
distortion of the marketplace of ideas and to guard against abuse of
individuals and groups holding minority or disfavored views.”224 What
happens under the California statute is “a predictably anti-business bias . . .
with the dangerous potential to distort public opinion and policy in an area
already prone to political hay-making.”225
2. The First Amendment protects corporations from some kinds of state
regulation
The amicus brief filed by the United States in support of Nike first
appears to sidestep the metaphors, but nonetheless assumes that corporations
are among those protected from some kinds of state regulation under the First
Amendment.226 The brief poses the question presented as “Whether the First
Amendment . . . permits a private party to seek redress for a company’s
allegedly false and misleading statements about the production of the goods
that the company sells, if the private party himself did not rely on those
statements, purchase the goods, or suffer any actual injury by reason of such

220. Id. at 3.
221. Amicus Br. of AFL-CIO, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003
WL 835038).
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Amicus Br. of Center for Individual Freedom at 22, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (available at 2003 WL 835292).
225. Id. at 24.
226. Amicus Br. for the United States, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at
WL 899100).
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reliance.”227 The brief’s answer: although the First Amendment “allows
government regulation of speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading,” it
does not “allow States to create legal regimes in which a private party who has
suffered no actual injury may seek redress on behalf of the public for a
company’s allegedly false and misleading statements,” regardless of whether
the statements are commercial or noncommercial.228 Traditional forms of
government regulation of false advertising do not unacceptably chill or
impinge on First Amendment values, but “California’s apparently unique
provision that a private party may sue for misrepresentation — even though
the party did not reasonably rely on the statement, did not make a purchase,
and was not injured in any way — has the capacity to chill protected
speech.”229
This is so because corporations are like other participants in a public
debate: “Companies like Nike that seek to engage in a debate on issues
of public concern with a connection to their own operations (if only to
respond to their critics) may well think long and hard before subjecting
themselves to the risk of a judgment . . . .”230 Like individual speakers,
corporations can be deterred from speaking:
California’s private cause of action may thus deter commercial
speakers from addressing the very issues of public concern about
which they may be most knowledgeable, despite the fact that the
speakers “believe their statements to be true” and even though
the statements are “in fact true” — “because of doubt whether they
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”231
3. Because the marketplace is harmed by false commercial speech, the state may
regulate Nike’s representations
The Kasky brief seeks to distance Nike from individual speakers and
refers to its representations rather than its speech, but the brief stays within
the market context, arguing at length about whether Nike’s representations
fall under the established doctrine that some commercial speech can be
regulated because of its impact in the marketplace. Here, the core question is
described as “[w]hether Nike’s factual representations about the conditions
under which its products are made, as alleged in the complaint, are
commercial speech subject to laws regulating false or misleading commercial
messages.”232

227. Id. at I.
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id. at 17-20.
230. Id. at 25.
231. Id. at 25 (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279).
232. Br. of Respt., supra n. 153. The Kasky brief also argues, successfully as it turns out,
that the Court has no jurisdiction because there has been no judgment entered against Nike and
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After arguing that Nike’s representations are commercial speech, the brief
asserts the market’s limits: the First Amendment protects commercial speech
to safeguard the free flow of information but that rationale does not apply to
false and misleading statements. “Commercial speech is protected because it
conveys truthful information to consumers for them to rely on in making
informed purchasing decisions,” so the First Amendment permits the
government to regulate false or misleading commercial speech. Kasky’s
allegations about Nike’s statements fit precisely into the resulting framework:
“Nike’s representations about the conditions under which its products are
made provided factual information for consumers to rely on in their
purchasing decisions” and “[i]n making these representations, Nike’s purpose
was to induce purchases by consumers.”233
On Kasky’s behalf, most amicus briefs accept the metaphor that the
corporation is a person but argue that Nike’s speech is commercial speech
that is not protected by the market. For example, a brief filed by several
members of Congress phrased the issue as “whether the First Amendment
protects a company’s making false factual statements about its products.”234
The brief notes that “[i]f Nike’s speech is regarded as political and as such is
protected by the First Amendment despite its falsity, then Nike will have
greater First Amendment protection than its critics. Nike’s speech, unlike its
critics’, will not be covered by defamation law, and unless the Court creates a
new First Amendment category that would allow prohibition of nondefamatory political speech, states would be powerless to regulate.”235 In
contrast, while relying on the marketplace of ideas metaphor, the brief argues
that the “marketplace of ideas will not protect consumers from the harms of
false statements” when the statements are commercial speech.236 Another
amicus brief filed on behalf of Kasky similarly relies on and distinguishes the
marketplace metaphor: “The broad dissemination of truthful information
about goods and services is necessary for the efficient allocation of resources.
However, dissemination of inaccurate information distorts our economy,
reduces consumer welfare and injures honest competitors.”237
To reinforce its first argument that regulation of a business corporation’s
factual statements about its own operations is necessary “to preserve the
integrity of the marketplace of ideas,” the reclaimdemocracy.org brief notes
that the speech of business corporations has been protected “primarily for its
presumed value to the listening public rather than because of a putative right

because Nike failed to show that the case fell within any exception to the final judgment rule.
Id. at 11.
233. Id. at 29-34.
234. Amicus Br. by Members of the United States Congress at 2, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539
U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 1844684).
235. Id. at 18.
236. Id. at 3.
237. Amicus Br. for the National Association of Consumer Advocates at 4, Nike, Inc. v.
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (available at 2003 WL 1844784).
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of corporate self-expression.”238 This hearer-centered basis is different
from the traditional speaker-centered First Amendment rationale. Although
the right to speak protects self-expression, the right to hear “protects the
interchange of ideas rather than protecting the dignity of the speaker.”
Because of this difference, “[t]he hearer-centered protection allows more
expansive regulation of speech because regulations should safeguard the
ability of the listener to evaluate and thus protect the integrity of the
marketplace of ideas.”239
Adopting the more complex marketplace metaphor, the brief argues that
the marketplace of ideas, like the commercial market, “needs accurate
information to function efficiently. Within the ‘marketplace of ideas,’
however, the countervailing First Amendment interest in individual selfexpression generally prevents regulation of the content of speech.”240 There is
no similar countervailing interest for business corporations. In addition,
“unlike in other First Amendment contexts in which the listening public may
assess inaccuracies or inconsistencies by comparison with other contradictory
speech, the public here cannot adequately assess Nike’s speech because others
have limited access to the facts.”241
C. The decision: refusing to decide
After receiving briefs and hearing oral argument, the Supreme Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.242 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens gave three reasons for dismissing the writ: the
judgment entered by the California Supreme Court was not final, neither party
had standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, and the reasons for
avoiding premature judgment on novel constitutional questions applied. 243
The case presented novel questions “because the speech at issue represents a
blending of commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an
issue of public importance.”244 Favoring a finding of commercial speech, the
complaint alleged that “direct communications with customers and potential
customers that were intended to generate sales . . . contained significant faulty
misstatements.”
Favoring a finding of noncommercial speech, “the
communications were part of an ongoing discussion and debate.”
“Knowledgeable persons should be free to participate in such debates
without fear of unfair reprisal,” and “[t]he interest in protecting such
participants” from any chilling effects is important.245

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9-10.
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
123 S. Ct. at 2555 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2558-59.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer went farther. The case focused, he
said, on the protection provided by the First Amendment to efforts by Nike
to respond to severe criticisms of its labor practices.246 “In my view . . . the
questions presented directly concern the freedom of Americans to speak
about public matters in public debate . . . .”247 An action to enforce the
California statute “discourages Nike from engaging in speech.”248 Under
the California statute, the threat of private individual enforcement “means a
commercial speaker must take particular care — considerably more care
than the speaker’s noncommercial opponents — when speaking on public
matters.”249 Such uncertainty creates “concern that the commercial speaker
engaging in public debate suffers a handicap that noncommercial opponents
do not.”250
V. Lessons for Lawyers
The cognitive theory of metaphor provides a lens for studying the written
work of lawyers and judges and a map for constructing persuasive legal
documents. Understanding how metaphor can affect legal decision making
requires us first to focus on the metaphor and then to examine how it shapes
and controls our subsequent thinking about a subject.251 “While metaphors
can be abused in many different ways, the most serious and interesting danger
is that a given metaphor or its allegorical extension may be transformed into
myth. . . . The metaphor is turned into, not only a literal truth, but the literal
truth about the principal subject in question.”252 As the briefs described in
Section IV demonstrate, the First Amendment metaphors examined here have
achieved almost that status: most lawyers and judges assume that a
corporation has the right to compete equally in the marketplace of ideas
subject only to state regulation of its advertising of products for sale.
These First Amendment metaphors have created an assumed reality and
become “a self-fulfilling prophecy.” They shape future actions; when those
actions fit the metaphor, the metaphor is reinforced because it seems
meaningful.253
The perils of metaphor are not news. They have been well expressed
from Justice Cardozo’s metaphoric warning that “[m]etaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often
by enslaving it”254 to Justice Potter Stewart’s statement that “the Court’s task
246. Id. at 2559 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2560.
248. Id. at 2561.
249. Id. at 2567.
250. Id.
251. Winter, Standing, supra n. 6, at 1387.
252. Id. (quoting Berggren, The Use and Abuse of Metaphor, I, 16 Rev. Metaphysics: Phil. Q.
236, 244-45 (1962-63)).
253. Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 156.
254. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58 (1926).
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is not responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of metaphors like the
‘wall of separation’ ”255 to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ statement that “[i]t
is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases
and therefore for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.”256
The cognitive theory of metaphor offers a corresponding promise to
uncover and to build on the power of metaphor. This article thus concludes
with three suggestions for practicing lawyers.
First, by studying the use of metaphor and its cognitive effects, we can
improve our understanding of how the law develops and how we might affect
that development. An awareness of the cognitive power of metaphor, and of
other methods of understanding one thing “in terms of” or “as” another, will
help lawyers uncover the narratives, metaphors, and analogies that underlie
much legal reasoning. Many of these imaginative maps for understanding are
so deeply embedded in the development of the law and in our consciousness
that we hardly realize they are there. If they go unnoticed, it is impossible to
understand their impact or to counteract their effects.
Second, lawyers can and should use metaphor creatively and consciously
as a conceptual tool with recognized persuasive power. Metaphor focuses a
spotlight on some aspects of a concept, reflects other aspects, and eclipses still
others. Metaphor carries over from one source to another attributes,
inferences, frameworks, reasoning methods, and evaluation standards. The
use of metaphor can help the writer persuade the reader to “make the leap”
and to do it “in such a way as to make it seem graceful, compelling, even
obvious.”257 As a result, lawyers should learn to choose and use their
metaphors with care and to closely examine those used by others.
In Kasky v. Nike, for example, failing to question the corporation-as-aperson metaphor makes it difficult to dispute that Nike is indistinguishable
from other competitors in the market or other participants in a debate. Given
the results of cognitive research, it seems unlikely that simply uncovering the
metaphor would persuade Supreme Court justices to consider the corporation
from another perspective. “A safer therapeutic strategy may be . . . to fight
metaphor with metaphor,” substituting one that is more consistent with the
attributes of corporations while still making “intelligible the treatment of
organizations as legal actors.”258 For example, substituting the metaphor of
the corporation as an intelligent machine would force decision-makers to

255. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962).
256. Hyde v. U.S., 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912).
257. Dan-Cohen, supra n. 124, at 42 (quoting Donald Schon, Generative Metaphor: A
Perspective on Problem-setting in Social Policy, in Metaphor and Thought 137 (Andrew Ortony ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 1993)).
258. Dan-Cohen, supra n. 124, at 45. For more on creating new metaphors, see Michael R.
Smith, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writing 217-21 (Aspen L. & Bus.
2002); George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language, in Philosophical
Perspectives on Metaphor 286, supra n. 13, at 318-22.
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confront the distinguishing characteristics of corporations because the entity
could not just be fit within the prevailing understanding of a person.259
By adopting another metaphor, Kasky could have argued not that Nike’s
speech was of lesser value because it was commercial speech, but instead that
what Nike manufactures, distributes, and sells is not speech at all. For
example, as did one amicus brief, the lawyers could have suggested that Nike’s
corporate public relations products should be viewed “as” manufactured
images, marketing tools, and cultivated commodities.260 Viewed as cabbages,
cars, or shoes, Nike’s representations can be seen “as” part of a process that
involves no First Amendment values at all. The public relations products that
Nike manufactures and disseminates are like any other product the
corporation makes. Like other products, public relations products are made
by corporate employees who are not expressing their own ideas or views but
instead are responding to corporate designs and directions; the content of the
product is influenced not by self-expression or enhancement of knowledge
but by sales potential. Like other products, their manufacture, distribution,
and sale should be subject to state regulation to protect the public.
Similarly, the marketing of Nike’s public relations image could be depicted
as the marketing of an investment opportunity. Representations designed to
sell the image would be as subject to state regulation as representations that
are designed to pique interest in the investment. Just as regulation of
statements made in connection with investments is necessary to assure that
investors do not make purchases based on inaccurate or misleading
information, regulation of statements made in connection with sales of a
particular public relations image is necessary to assure that listeners do not
buy the image without accurate information.
As for the marketplace of ideas, a lawyer might argue instead that the
First Amendment protects the quest for truth or the free flow of truthful
information. “By relying on the Holmes metaphor, we have chosen to
highlight competitiveness in the buying and selling of ideas; had a ‘quest’
metaphor prevailed, we would be highlighting searching, a journey . . . .” 261
The battle between truth and falsehood is a conventional metaphor that might
also provide an alternative structure for reasoning about First Amendment
application, perhaps carrying over concepts of a “fair fight” and a “level
playing field.”
Third, understanding the cognitive power of metaphor helps lawyers
gauge their ability to overturn a longstanding or dominant metaphor as well as
the desirability of sidestepping it or tapping into its power. For example, the
personification metaphor is both widespread and helpful; it “allows us to

259. To support this metaphor, Dan-Cohen first tells the story of the evolution of a
corporation to illustrate that once established, a corporation could do everything it does
without any human beings at all. Dan-Cohen, supra n. 124, at 44-51.
260. See supra nn. 203-05 and accompanying text.
261. Bosmajian, supra n. 116, at 201.
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comprehend a wide variety of experiences with nonhuman entities.”262
Because the metaphor allows us to provide a “coherent account,” it is difficult
to resist. Uncovering the metaphor and recognizing its power will allow
advocates to make an informed decision about whether to stage a head-on
confrontation, rejecting the metaphor altogether, as did the amicus brief filed
by ReclaimDemocracy.org263 — advance from the side, portraying Nike’s
representations as manufactured products264 — or sneak up from the rear,
reframing the issue as whether States can allow private parties to sue for false
or misleading statements in the absence of actual injury, as did the brief filed
by the United States.265
The lawyer who wants to influence judicial perceptions and decisions can
draw on the insights of cognitive research. A new metaphor can make the
target experience understandable in a different light by highlighting some
aspects of the target and suppressing others. The new metaphor may entail
very specific aspects of the source concept, and in this way, it can give the
target a new meaning, sanctioning different actions, justifying revised
inferences, and leading to different goals and results.266 Like the old
metaphor, the new metaphor will be more persuasive to the extent that it
grows out of bodily experience with the physical environment. The new
metaphor, like the old, will be more persuasive to the extent that it accords
with our cultural context, fully structures our understanding of the target, and
efficiently allows us to borrow methods of reasoning and evaluation from the
source.
Rather than a wholly new metaphor, cognitive theory also suggests ways
to re-view a current metaphor. So, for example, the marketplace metaphor
“need not carry the baggage of economic theory.”267 The market could
instead be depicted as the Greek agora, which served both as a market and as
a central meeting place. As a public assembly for the exchange of views, the
marketplace must include diverse and plural voices rather than a few
overpowering ones.268 Such a conception of the market might focus on the
protecting the process of the exchange; this might allow government
regulation to assure effective access to the market, to guard against
monopolization, and to avoid the unequal results that flow from formal
equality.
Although metaphor can lead to unthinking acceptance of inapt, outdated,
or invalid doctrines, thinking metaphorically is an inescapable and
fundamental method of increasing understanding. “If we are in doubt as to
what an object is . . . we deliberately try to consider it in as many different
terms as its nature permits: lifting, smelling, tasting, tapping, holding in
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, supra n. 6, at 33.
See supra nn. 199-202 and accompanying text.
See supra nn. 203-04 and accompanying text.
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Lakoff & Johnson, supra n. 258, at 318.
Cole, supra n. 116, at 894.
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different lights, subjecting to different pressures, dividing, matching,
contrasting . . . .”269 So too with a concept such as corporate speaking.
Consider it in a new light: what is its sound? how is it made? is it words,
phrases, sentences, ideas, views? is it like writing poetry? or is it like making
shoes?

269. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric of Motives 504 (World Publg. Co.
1962) (quoted in Bosmajian, supra n. 116, at 205).

